SOME OBSERVATIONS CONCERNING
SENATE RESOLUTION 448
PREPARED FOR CONSIDERATION BY
THE ILLINOIS STATE SENATE
EDUCATION COMMITTEE
AND DELIVERED ON JULY 5, 1994

GREGORY HOLMES SINGLETON, Ph.D.
PROFESSOR OF HISTORY
NORTHEASTERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY

Few topics generate as much controversy, fear and irrational reaction as "alternative" or "non-normative" religions. The problem is difficult enough in a political body with one dominant or established religious form. The situation in the United States is complicated by a number of factors. Primary among them are a legal tradition of religious freedom and the multiplicity of religious forms. This reality makes your task under SR 448 complex and unenviable.

I present the following observations as a scholar who has spent over twenty years investigating, analyzing and interpreting the religious elements of America's past and present. I do so as part of my mandate as a professor at a public university to provide service to the State of Illinois within my area of competence. My interest in this matter is primarily professional. I am a member of the Evangelical Lutheran Church in America, which is a "mainstream" denomination. I have, that is to say, no brief to present on behalf of "cults."

It is as a scholar with a specialty in the study of religion in America that I have serious reservations about the assumptions articulated in Senate Resolution 448. The wording of the foundation ("Whereas") clauses is imprecise, vague and misleading. My concern is that this Committee develop the final report based on a solid understanding of religion in its infinite variety in American life. I applaud your decision to consult those of us who have systematically studied the phenomenon. The rhetoric of the resolution (which I realize is not the product of the committee) suggests that the document was influenced by religious and/or secular organizations with ideological agendas which put them at odds with the groups they have generically labeled as "cults." At the very least, the committee should require that those who are calling for action define what they mean by "cult" and identify the alleged 2000 organizations thus labeled. This information should then be measured against scholarly evaluations.

I hope that I can aid in that process with the following observations, which fall into two general categories: (a) PROCEDURAL and (b) CONCEPTUAL.

The PROCEDURAL problem can be addressed simply. In all fairness, testimony should be explicitly solicited from persons who are members of organizations designated as "cults." One would gain a biased and skewed impression of the Roman Catholic Church, the Pentecostal Church, or even the Evangelical Lutheran Church in America if one limited the information base to former members, organizations opposed to the denomination in question, and families of those who have chosen any of these organizations as a different path. One would certainly want to talk to those who have chosen that path and seem to be happy with it. One could argue that they are covered under "other witnesses," but the interests of fairness and objectivity would best be served by explicitly soliciting testimony from such sources.

The CONCEPTUAL observations are more elaborate. For the sake of clarity and relative brevity, I will address the specific foundation clauses of the Resolution.

"WHEREAS, The recent activities of David Koresh and his Branch Davidian sect in Waco, Texas have increased national awareness of the destructive nature of cult activities. . ."

The word "awareness" is bothersome here. The media attention given to the events in Waco has, quite properly, given rise to a variety of concerns. Concern, however, is not the same thing as awareness. The phrasing of this section of the Resolution presupposes a body of certain knowledge of which the public has become aware. I would suggest that part of the committee's responsibility is to test that assumption. As it stands, this section of the resolution begs an important question. Do we have sufficient evidence that the Branch Davidian incident is typical of a general trend among "cults"? Would the aberrant activities of one minister, priest, rabbi or congregation of a "mainstream" denomination call into question the ethos and activities of Protestantism, Catholicism, or Judaism in general?

The most serious problem with this section of the Resolution (and the Resolution in general) however, is the word "cult." It is used throughout without definition. The term comes from the Latin cultus, one meaning of which is "to worship". The Roman Catholic Church uses the term in a variety of contexts: e.g., the Cult of the Blessed Sacrament; the Cult of the Blessed Virgin Mary. In the early twentieth century the term was given more precise Sociological definition. Max Weber and Ernst Troeltsch, and a variety of scholars since, have used the term "cult" as one of three major categories of religious organizations. The other two are "church" and "sect." A "church" is generally made up of people who are members of the social and political establishment, and who are usually among the more affluent members of the larger society. "Churches" usually endorse the prevailing social order. A "sect" is generally made up of people who are marginalized-- socially, economically, and politically. "Sects" usually consist of people who have ben excluded, or have withdrawn, from "Churches" and often see themselves at odds with the prevailing social order. A "cult" is generally made up of people who are alienated. The adherents often have no social ties except for the "cult". Crucial to the concept of a "cult" is the central authority of a strong charismatic leader. Please note that I have used terms such as "generally," "usually," and "often." Neither Weber nor Troeltsch nor any who have written in their tradition have accepted the "Church--Sect--Cult" typology as anything except a device for facilitating scholarly analysis. Not everyone, nor every congregation, in a "church" is "church"-like. The literature is filled with examples of "sect"-like and "cult"-like clusters within mainline "Churches." A Pentecostalist Assembly may exhibit "sect"- like characteristics in New York City, but might be a "church" in rural West Virginia. The term "cult of personality" has been used frequently to describe the relationship between specific charismatic ministers and their congregations in a variety of mainstream "churches." One person's "cult" may well be another person's "church." Indeed, those of us involved in the study of religious forms have often commented that it is easy to define a "church," "sect," or "cult," but identifying a specific organization as one of these categories is very difficult.

This last point has been the subject of a significant portion of scholarly studies of religion in America published in the last two decades. Realizing the slippery nature of the three categories, several noted scholars have eschewed the terms "sect" and "cult" in favor of "unconventional," "experimental," "religious outsiders," and the like. This has not been a mere exercise in cosmetic rhetoric. It is a recognition of the fluid nature of religious organizations. "Cults" and "sects," while in origin peripheral or alienated from the core of society, often go through a developmental process and become "churches." In our own national history, we have many examples of the process, the most famous of which are the Latter Day Saints (Mormons) and Christian Scientists. Indeed, every Christian denomination can be understood as the outgrowth of a "cult" or a "sect". All Christians trace their origins to the first century of the Common Era when adherents of the faith were waiting for the physical return of the risen Jesus, their charismatic leader. The creeds and confessional formulations associated with "Church"-like organizations were largely absent from the first three centuries of Christianity, and were flatly rejected by some of the reformers of the sixteenth century, who were called "sectarians." Even if we could all agree on what constitutes a "cult," "sect" or "church" at any given time, the protean nature of these organizations makes permanent categories impossible.

"WHEREAS, It has been estimated that there are as many as 2,000 cults operating within the United States with 4 million to 6 million members. . "

This foundation clause can be dealt with briefly. I have frequently seen such claims with both higher and lower estimates. I have never seen a convincing discussion of the data bases, the operational definitions of "cult," or the methods used to derive these estimates.

Even if the estimate in the Resolution is valid, what is the interest of the State of Illinois in such information? While such numbers may be alarming to religious and ideological "competitors," the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution would suggest that this ought to be a matter of indifference to Federal and State governments. Even if we had an adequate definition of the term "cult" and precise information, the Constitutional prohibition against legislation respecting an establishment of religion raises serious questions about the wisdom--and legitimacy--of using any typology which distinguishes between types of religious organizations as the basis for public policy.

"WHEREAS, Cult recruitment activities are often directed towards students on college campuses. . ."

I would accept this as almost axiomatic. All kinds of organizations, from MacDonalds to the Central Intelligence Agency, recruit on college campuses. I recall both the Campus Crusade for Christ (Conservative Evangelical) and the Newman Center (Roman Catholic) attempting to convince me of the error of my neo-orthodox ways during my undergraduate years. The Newman Center, by the way, was named after an Anglican convert to Roman Catholicism, and at the college I attended was staffed by Paulist Fathers who had an apostolate to reclaim lost Protestants. Christian religions (among others) are in the conversion (that is to say, recruitment) business, no matter how they are classified.

"WHEREAS, College students are particularly vulnerable to cult recruitment because they are often wrestling with becoming independent, overwhelmed with new responsibilities and relationships, adjusting to new environments, and anxious about their future. . ."

This statement is probably true, but incomplete. College students encounter a world of analysis and interpretation they may not have been exposed to before. It is a time of excitement, anxiety and experimentation. As a result, college students are particularly vulnerable (that is to say, open) to a variety of alternative idea systems. It was within such an intellectual climate that luminaries such as Robert Lowell, Avery Dulles, and Thomas Merton underwent profound conversion experiences. All three became prominent Roman Catholics, and were subjected to initial ostracism by some members of their families.

"WHEREAS, College students who become involved with cults undergo personality changes, suffer academically, are alienated from their families, and are robbed of the very things universities were designed to encourage: freedom of thought, intellectual growth, and personal development. . . "

I have seen only anecdotal evidence to support any of these assertions (e.g. "Well, my neighbor's cousin's son went to Southern Illinois University, and. . ."). My observation (something more than a collection of anecdotes but less than a systematic study) based on over two decades of full-time college teaching is that some students do undergo personality changes, suffer academically, and are alienated from their families. I know of two cases where these things happened coincident with (but not necessarily caused by) a student's involvement in a new religion. The great majority of cases with which I am familiar, however, have to do with falling in love (which includes alienation, if the family of origin disapproves of the object of affection's ethnic group), adopting a new political ideology, or finding a worthy cause which re-orients energies, exasperates parents, and robs time from studies. The causes are varied, from Animal Rights to Pro-Life Activism. When the student places the cause before studies, family and friends, we see the changes described in this foundation clause. I hope that the committee will solicit testimony from a scholar with competence in the area of Student Development who has either conducted research into this area or is qualified to summarize the body of literature on this subject.

Whatever the literature suggests about personality change, academic performance, or familial alienation, what shall we do? Shall we preserve freedom of thought, intellectual growth and personal development by forbidding students to explore new directions, intellectually, politically, socially any spiritually? Put another way, are we to defend freedom of inquiry by denying certain kinds of inquiry? To follow this logic would lead to a world of raging contradiction.

"WHEREAS, Some college administrators have become concerned about cult activities on campus and have taken action to address the situation, but many others have failed to recognize the threat, have refused to deal with the problem, or are searching for policy directions as to how to deal with it. . ."

As with the first foundation clause, this one begs a question. The wording assumes that the situation described in the Resolution has an unchallengeable reality and that administrators have either done their duty, have failed to do so, or are muddling along looking for direction.

I would argue that colleges and universities in the State of Illinois already have an arsenal of laws and policies to use if any individual or organization harasses a student. Why do we need additional policies and procedures? What could be done that is not already being done? What is the extraordinary power of "cults" which calls for extraordinary measures? How can the State or any college administration identify a "cult," given the difficulty specialists have in doing so. Even if college and university administrators could so identify such religious organizations, can they do that without violating the letter and spirit of the Constitution? How can an administration bar the proselytic activities of one religious organization and not others without violating the establishment clause of the First Amendment? If any given organization or individual violates established policy, then the administration should take action, BUT THE ACTION SHOULD BE TAKEN BECAUSE A SPECIFIC BEHAVIOR HAS VIOLATED A GENERAL POLICY, NOT BECAUSE THE BEHAVIOR IN QUESTION IS ASSOCIATED WITH A SPECIFIC GROUP.

I could say a great deal more in elaboration of the points already raised. I could also offer an analysis of the dynamics in American culture which gives rise to these concerns, but I have already tried the patience of the committee. I stand ready to respond to any of the issues raised.